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Abstract
This paper looks at the wider system surrounding
a “Mondex” electronic purse. It does this from a process-
oriented perspective using the pi-calculus. Our model in-
cludes the issuing of purses by an authorised bank and the
decisions of cardholders to participate in transactions.
1 Introduction
One of UKCRC’s1 “Grand Challenges”2 is that on “De-
pendable Systems Evolution”3 [16]. One objective is to ex-
periment –with formal methods– on an “electronic purse”
system whose details are derived from that which went un-
der the name “Mondex”. The common source document for
the experiments is [14]. In particular that report sets out an
important security property that should hold (i.e. it should
not be possible to “print money”) and there is interest in
how this can be proved in various approaches.
It is our position that no one “formal method” is likely
to be adequate for exploration of all facets of a problem
like electronic purses. Henderson’s thesis [5] is one exam-
ple where a collection of formal approaches are used and
each illustrates different facets of a difficult problem. One
could also point to the work on “Dynamic Coalitions” in [1],
which uses a state based approach to illuminate the space
of options that hide behind the buzz phrase. Other aspects
of elements such as the communication behaviour might
well have been tackled using process algebraic approaches
but the cited reference studies the space of systems using a
model-oriented approach (VDM [8, 7]).
The pi-calculus is described in [11, 12]; it is a develop-
ment of CCS [10] that permits the passing of process names
∗This paper appears in ICECCS ’07: Proceedings of the 12th IEEE
Inter- national Conference on Engineering Complex Computer Systems
(ICECCS 2007), pages 300–306, Washington, DC, USA, 2007. IEEE
Computer Society.
1See www.ukcrc.org.uk
2See www.ukcrc.org.uk/grand challenges/index.cfm
3See www.bcs.org/server.php?show=ConWebDoc.4721
as parameters.
Our focus in this paper is on the way in which the ν name
binding can be used to establish private communication be-
tween processes. In fact, one key issue that such a process
algebraic approach clarifies is that it is necessary to be pre-
cise about what is included in or excluded from such a sys-
tem. We are not, of course, suggesting that the ν operator
is a solution to the delicate implementation issue of how to
ensure that only authorised purses can be used in payment.
We are only claiming that this is a useful abstraction whose
properties express one facet of this problem rather naturally.
Section 2 of this paper gives a basic outline of the Mon-
dex system and the pi-calculus. Our model is presented in
Section 3 and Section 4 includes an extension that addresses
the physicality of our model. In Section 5 we consider tool
support as a means of verification and we draw conclusions
from our work in Section 6.
2 Background
2.1 Mondex: An Electronic Purse
The Mondex electronic purse system was a real develop-
ment by the NatWest Development Team; the system was
evaluated by the EU under the Information Technology Se-
curity Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC). ITSEC has seven levels
of security certification — E0 through E6 (lowest to high-
est). The Mondex system achieved an E6 level of certifi-
cation; this required both evaluation and proof of the de-
sign, hence a formal specification was undertaken using the
Z method. A version of the Z specification was eventually
published in a monograph from Oxford University [14].
The main component of the Mondex system is the purse.
A purse holds monetary value and allows the holder to
transfer sums of money to other Mondex purses. A purse
is hosted on a smartcard. Transfers require card readers in
order to allow these smartcards to communicate and these
card readers are (confusingly) known as wallets.
Wallets have three modes of operation. With a single-
slot card reader, the two purses are inserted sequentially
and money is transferred first to the wallet and then to the
receiving purse (this is possible because a wallet itself con-
tains an integrated purse). A two-slot card reader allows the
two purses to be inserted simultaneously. The third mode is
a networked mode in which two card readers are connected
via a phone line. This paper focuses on the two-slot mode.
The Mondex system is interesting because the smart-
cards are autonomous: they perform offline transactions
without the aid of a central authority or logging ability. Se-
curity (i.e. cryptography) is performed on-card.
The security requirements of the system were captured
by decribing a number of “security properties”. The main
property required by the bank is no value creation, i.e. the
sum of all purse balances does not increase. The other main
properties are all value accounted, the sum of all purse bal-
ances does not change; authentic purses, only authorised
cards can participate in transactions (cryptography is as-
sumed to work and ‘strength of mechanism arguments’ are
absent from the monograph); and sufficient funds, a purse
can only transfer value up to the amount of its current bal-
ance.
2.2 pi-calculus
The pi-calculus is a process algebra developed as a con-
tinuation of the work on CCS (Communication Concurrent
Systems); like CCS and other process algebras, it allows us
to model systems in terms of processes communicating with
other process.
The basic units of the pi-calculus are names. Names are
channels of communication; the prefix operators input —
x(y).P — and output — x y.P — allow processes to com-
municate synchronously. Two processes willing to synchro-
nise on the same channel name can communicate (and pass
variables as parameters). A key property of the pi-calculus is
that names can be passed as variables and used as channels
for further communications.
Terms in the pi-calculus can be composed sequentially,
P.Q (‘then’); in parallel, P | Q (in which P and Q are
both able to communicate); or using external choice, + (in
which only P or Q can communicate; in so doing the other
term transitions to 0, the nil process).
The . operator can be used to indicate that a process pro-
ceeds to behave like another named process; this property
permits tail recursion. Replication allows us to say that a
process can always perform a particular communcation; the
! (‘bang’) operator is effectively a shorthand for P | !P .
As discussed previously, the ν operator is key to our
model. It creates a ‘new’, unique channel name and binds
that name in the following process term. This name is pri-
vate; it cannot be known to external processes (and thus
used for communication) until it is explicitly provided to
another process over a known channel.
Our notation also uses
∑
i∈{1,...,n} Pi as a short hand for
multiple choice, P0 + ... + Pn and
∏
i∈{1,...,n} Pi as a
shorthand for multiple parallel composition, P0 | ... | Pn.
3 A pi-calculus Model
3.1 Design Choices
Previous treatments of the “Mondex” system have
looked at transactions between purses predominantly from
a state-based perspective (e.g. [13]). They aim to show that
the security properties (e.g. no money creation) hold in the
system.
We felt however that it would also be interesting to
look at the customers’ decisions to exchange money –deal
brokering– and at the way in which the bank issues purses
to customers.
3.1.1 Deal Brokering
Our initial approach was to model deal brokering as a sum-
mation of “deals” between each pair of customers. In this
case, transactions could occur non-deterministically. This
approach led, however, to a possible deadlock (reminis-
cent of the dining philosophers’ problem) where a customer
could attempt more than one simultaneous deal and dead-
lock the process. This is exposed as a problem if timeouts
are introduced during refinement, because the abstract sys-
tem cannot achieve resolution of deadlock whereas the im-
plementation has extra behaviours.
To combat this, we changed our model so that customers
can non-deterministically attempt a transaction with a dis-
tinct purse; a pair of customers must agree (i.e. synchronise)
on the transaction. This synchronisation then prohibits ei-
ther customer from attempting other transactions until the
current transaction has ended — either through success,
failure or one party deciding to abort.
3.1.2 The Bank
The bank has been modelled to accept requests from cus-
tomers for purses. The key question we faced was the role
of the bank in authenticating purses. Since the bank creates
all purses, it is possible to hold a set of ‘authorised purses’
against which the bank could check a given purse before a
transaction. This abstract authorisation would aid in show-
ing that the security properties hold. Unfortunately, in the
real system, purses exist “on their own” and wallets cannot
defer to the bank, hence this authentication would have to
be refined before implementation.
We thus decided to model the system more closely, by
having the bank simply create purses and relinquish them to
customers; it is then up to the wallets –presumably through
a form of secret key authentication– to verify the authentic-
ity of a purse.
3.2 Our Chosen pi-calculus Definition
The top-level process in the model is World – the world
contains a bank (which can issue purses); a number of cus-
tomers (who initially do not own purses); and a number of
wallets (required for transactions):
Bank |

 ∏
i∈{1,...,n}
CustNoPi

 |

 ∏
x∈{1,...,w}
Walletx


The bank is able to issue purses at the request of a customer.
Bank
def
= ! (νp)
(
reqp(ci).ci p
)
.Pp
As in the physical system, the bank is unable to authenticate
a purse once it has entered ‘the real world’. Each purse is cre-
ated with a new, unique channel — it is the intention that this can
represent the secret of the purse.
A customer without a purse is able to request one; they provide
a private channel to the bank over which they receive their purse’s
identity.
CustNoPi
def
= (νci)reqp ci.ci(p).Custip
Once a customer has received a purse, they are able to partic-
ipate in transactions. The channel p is their unique connection to
the purse.
A customer with a purse is able to participate in transactions.
They may request a transfer of arbitrary value from any other purse
–or– accept an incoming request. Performing either of these ac-
tions causes the customer to enter a state in which they can no
longer perform further transactions until the current one is com-
plete.
Custip
def
=

 ∑
j∈{1,...,n}
reqj v + reqi(v)

.CustTip
Note that customers are indexed by i and p, where i is effec-
tively a public identity used by other purses to request a transaction
and p is the private identity of the purse that is only used when it
is explicitly shared with a wallet.
Although not considered here, our model could be extended
to allow a customer to have multiple purses (i.e. a set of purse
identities). As long as each purse only participated in a single
transaction at any one time, this would not affect the integrity of
the model.
Once a pair of customers decide to initiate a transfer, they must
find a wallet with which to perform the transfer. This is modelled
as an external choice; although it is possible that the customers
may choose different wallets, deadlock is avoided because they
can always abort the transaction.
A customer participating in a transaction (CustTip) is released
after the transaction has completed successfully (ok), fails (f ) or
they decide to abort (ab). Once released, they return to being a
customer able to participate in further transactions (Custip).
CustTip
def
=
 ∑
x∈{1,...,w}
insertx p

.(okp() + fp() + abp ).Custip
A wallet is initially defined to be ready to accept one purse.
Walletx
def
= insertx(p).Walletxp
Once the first is purse inserted, it can be removed (and the wal-
let returns to being empty) or a second purse can be inserted — in
which case the transaction continues.
Walletxp
def
= abp().Walletx + insertx(q).
(
· · ·
)
For the transfer to occur, each purse must be authentic — we
know that the wallet must authorise a purse without deferring to
a central authority. If either purse is not considered authentic, the
transfer fails. It should be noted that the wallet only checks the
authenticity of the purses once both have been inserted. It could
be modelled to challenge (and possibly reject) the first purse as
soon as it is inserted, however this does not affect the integrity of
the model. Authentication is defined in Walletxp as...
(
if [[auth(p, q)]] th WalletCxpq el
(
fp |fq ).Walletx
)
At this stage, the wallet needs to perform some additional
checking before the transfer can occur. The first part of the defini-
tion for WalletC (below) allows either customer to abort the deal
at any point up to the actual transfer taking place in WalletT . The
ability of either customer to abort the process has been a difficult
issue. In “real life”, a customer could pull their card out at any
stage, but modelling this as a parallel process (as above) during
the transfer is tricky.
WalletCxpq
def
=
((
abp().fq + abq().fp
)
.Walletx | · · ·
)
Ideally, we would like an abort to release both purses, the sec-
ond customer and the wallet; more importantly, we need to en-
sure that the value of the transfer has either not left the original
purse (residing in the value or lost component), or has success-
fully been transfered to the requesting purse. We also wish to
model the failure of the transfer for other reasons (modelled as
a non-deterministic choice at this stage), while ensuring the same
properties hold and to introduce timeouts at a later stage.
While it is possible to devise a representation for this, we sus-
pect that it would be messy. In order to avoid the issue at this
stage, we simply do not allow the transfer to be aborted after a
certain point.
The wallet needs to know the value of the transfer and the di-
rection (e.g. p pays q). Also, you may recall that a customer is
able to attempt a transaction of arbitrary value, hence the wallet
must also ensure that there is enough money in the paying purse to
complete the transfer. These issues are represented by the abstract
processes [[KEY ]] (input from the keypad that yields a value v for
the transfer and swaps p and q as necessary) and [[BAL]] (balance
check for sending purse).
The rest of the definition for WalletC is:
(
[[KEY ]].if [[BAL]]v th WalletTxpqv el
(
fp |fq ).Walletx
)
The wallet is now able to perform the transfer. The wallet cre-
ates a new private channel c, which it uses for transfers. It acquires
send and receive channels from each purse, thus allowing it to in-
struct the purses to pass money.
WalletTxpqv
def
= (νc)
(
p c.c(Sp,Rp).q c.c(Sq ,Rq). · · ·
)
.Walletx
From the wallet’s perspective, the actual transfer occurs as be-
low. If successful, it releases the customers indicating this success
(ok), if not, it releases the customers with a fail (f ).
(
Sp v.
(
Sp(ACK).Rq v.(okp |okq ) + (fp |fq )
))
The purse itself consists of a value and a lost component (rep-
resented by abstract processes). The value is the current balance
of the purse; if a transfer didn’t complete, the value of that transfer
is recorded in the lost component (to be restored to the balance at
a later date).
Pp
def
= [[Vp]] | [[Lp]] | ! (νsr)
(
p(c).c sr.
(
· · ·
))
A purse performs transfers by synchronising with a wallet and
providing channels for sending and receiving money. When the
purse receives a request to send money, the amount is taken from
the value component — it then non-deterministically succeeds
(and acknowledges this fact to the wallet) or fails (adding the
amout to the lost component). A request to receive money adds
the amount to the value component.
s(v).[[Vp − v]].(sACK + [[Lp + v]]) + r(v).[[Vp + v]]
4 Physicality of the model
One drawback of our model, as it stands, is the distance be-
tween the representation and the reality of the physical system. It
is not exactly clear what p represents: in the present model, p is a
unique, private link to a purse that allows a customer to perform
transactions.
In reality, the original Mondex cards were intended to replace
cash. They could therefore be passed around, become lost or stolen
and used by whoever currently held the card (which might not
necessarily be the original owner of the money). There is no notion
of an authentic user in the system.
It is possible to extend our model to include a notion of loss of
ownership of purses. It is probably unnecessary to include this in
the full model, but is an interesting aside to show how the model
might be brought closer to the physicality of the real system.
World
def
= · · ·Lost{}
LostL
def
= lose(p).LostL∪{p} + find p.LostL\{p}
CustNoPi
def
= · · · + (find(p) + steal(p)).Custip
Custip
def
= (lose p+ steal p).CustNoPi + · · ·
In this extension, a customer with a purse can lose that purse
or have it stolen. In both cases, the customer loses the ability to
interact over p (and thus can no longer use the purse). When a
purse is lost, p enters “lost property”, an abstract place where purse
‘handles’ go when they are lost. When a purse is stolen, control of
p is directly transferred to the unscrupulous customer who stole it.
Customers without purses can still request one from the bank
(whose definition remains unchanged), or they may steal one.
They may also find a purse and gain control of a p from lost prop-
erty (and subsequently p is no longer lost). In all cases, they be-
come customers with purses and they can perform transactions by
means of p.
In all three cases (losing, stealing and finding a purse), this
extension assumes that the physical act occurs simultaneously (e.g.
a customer leaves their purse on a bus, or has their pocket picked).
Our model uses the notion of p as a private channel of commu-
nication to a purse in order to abstract away message authentica-
tion. This extension shows that “ownership” of p by a customer
(Custp) is simply a matter of circumstance that allows that cus-
tomer to use the purse at the current time and is not necessarily a
representation of legal ownership. It could be argued that p is a
property of the purse P and not of the customer using it.
5 Tool Support
The obvious tool to use when working with the pi-calculus is
the Mobility Workbench (MWB) [15], a tool for analysing systems
described in the polyadic pi-calculus. The Mobility Workbench
can be used to interactively simulate agents (by allowing the user
to select commitments) and to find and report deadlocks within an
agent. MWB can also perform model checking using modal logic
assertions and decide open bisimulation equivalences (for agents
with finite control).
We have taken a basic version of the model presented in Section
3.2 and run it through the MWB, looking for deadlocks. The ver-
sion used includes the issuing of purses to customers by the bank
and customers brokering deals (in the simple example, synchroni-
sation between customers). Not surprisingly, no deadlocks were
detected up to the maximum number of processes that the tool can
handle. The tool reported that a system with a single customer will
deadlock, which is correct – once the customer has been issued a
purse, it has no one to deal with and the bank has no one to whom
it can issue further purses.
The table below shows the results of the experiments, including
the number of customers in the model, the “size” of the state space
as reported by the tool and the time taken to check for deadlocks.
Customers “Size” Time (s)
1 3 0
2 11 0
3 55 0.031
4 357 1.422
5 n/a n/a
As one must expect, the time taken and/or storage required in-
creases exponentially with the number of processes. When the
system was increased to five customers (and the bank), the tool
crashed through lack of memory before a result was returned.
The ability of the tool to check modal logic assertions about
agents could prove useful in checking other properties of the sys-
tem, although it is currently unclear if this would allow us to say
anything of interest about the protocol.
If our model was extended with the message transfer protocol
of the original monograph –by refining the abstract transfer that
occurs between two purses in a wallet– the equivalence checking
ability of MWB could be used to show the observational equiv-
alence of any refinement that is made, but again this is currently
unclear.
The translation of pi-calculus terms into Petri-nets presented
in [3, 4] could allow model checking to be performed in the “as
yet unnamed” tools being developed by that group. The transla-
tion does not currently permit recursion and we have so far not
attempted a petri-net representation of our model.
6 Conclusions
Our model uses a process algebraic notation to represent not
only the transfer of money between purses, but also a way in which
the bank, customers and wallets might interact within the system.
It illustrates how the ν name binding can be used to model pri-
vate communication between these processes and that the ability
to pass these private channel names between processes provides us
with a concise abstraction from the issues of implementation.
In allowing customers to abort transactions, we have included
behaviours in the abstract model that may be required when time-
outs are introduced during refinement; this however causes prob-
lems if a customer aborts at a key stage of the transfer. Solutions
we have considered include some form of exception handling,
such as a catch; or perhaps an asymmetric operator that is sim-
ilar to | , which allows one term to be declared as uninterruptable
after a certain point.
When discussing our model, we realised that introducing a rep-
resentation of customers allows us to consider the authenticity of
users in the system as well as the authenticity of purses: is the
holder of the current purse authorised to use it? Again, the prob-
lem here is the isolation of wallets from a central authority; our
model could be extended to allow reasoning about the authentica-
tion of customers, i.e. using PIN numbers.
As well as customer authentication, we could expand the sys-
tem to include “hostile” processes that attempt to forge communi-
cations within the system – man-in-the-middle attacks, for exam-
ple – and determine their ability to affect the system.
If we wanted to reason about the implementation of our model,
one interesting possibility would be to look at developments of the
techniques proposed in [9] and developed in [2]; Koutny’s notion
of “interface refinement” is presented in a CSP [6] framework so
either new research is required or we would have to consider the
sub-problem that could be handled in CSP.
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8 Appendix: Model
World
def
= Bank |

 ∏
i∈{1,...,n}
CustNoPi

 |

 ∏
x∈{1,...,w}
Walletx


Bank
def
= ! (νp)
(
reqp(ci).ci p
)
.Pp
CustNoPi
def
= (νci)reqp ci.ci(p).Custip
Custip
def
=

 ∑
j∈{1,...,n}
reqj v + reqi(v)

.CustTip
CustTip
def
=

 ∑
x∈{1,...,w}
insertx p

.(okp() + fp() + abp ).Custip
Walletx
def
= insertx(p).Walletxp
Walletxp
def
= abp().Walletx + insertx(q).
(
if [[auth(p, q)]] th WalletCxpq el
(
fp |fq ).Walletx
)
WalletCxpq
def
=
((
abp().fq + abq().fp
)
.Walletx |
(
[[KEY ]].if [[BAL]]v th WalletTxpqv el
(
fp |fq ).Walletx
))
WalletTxpqv
def
= (νc)
(
p c.c(Sp,Rp).q c.c(Sq,Rq).
(
Sp v.
(
Sp(ACK).Rq v.(okp |okq ) + (fp |fq )
)))
.Walletx
Pp
def
= [[Vp]] | [[Lp]] | ! (νsr)
(
p(c).c sr.
(
s(v).[[Vp − v]].(sACK + [[Lp + v]]) + r(v).[[Vp + v]]
))
